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General Symbols and
General Studies
By

LARRY TYLER

An inherent difficulty in trans-disciplinary general education programs is the lack of a theoretical framework from which to display the
points of unity and convergence between those uniquely human endeavors that, in slavish compliance to custom, are yet discussed as
distinct and separate concerns such as science, art, mysticism, philosophy, and so on. This lack of a general theory makes all attempts at
integration seem strained and artificial. However, clues, hints, and
some significant beginnings toward such a framework do exist in the
work of several writers. A synthesis of those sources seems, perhaps,
in order.
As a point of departure, Suzanne Langer has suggested a "new
key" to intellectual activity: that the frame of reference of an era
is depicted by the questions that it asks and not by the answers it derives. Thus, "the intellectual treatment of any datum ... is determined
by the nature of our questions, and only carried out in the answers."
(Langer, 1961, p. 16)
This relativistic approach implies that reality is unknown and that
interpretations of reality are dictated by interest. At a different level,
this is cogently expressed in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: that language
defines as well as describes reality for its user.
Sapir has written that language "actually defines experience for us
by reason of its formal completeness and because of our unconscious
projection of its implicit expectations into the field of experience ...
Meanings are not so much discovered in experience as imposed upon
it, because of the tyrannical hold that linguistic form has upon our
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orientation in the world." (Sapir, in Hoijer, 1955, p. 93-94)
Though among the first to emphasize language as a determinant of
cultural reality, this view is not unique to Sapir. Much earlier, Durkheim stated much the same thesis:
Thinking consists in arranging our ideas, and consequently
in classifying them . . . But classifying is also naming, for a
general idea has no existence z.nd reality except in and by the
word which expresses it and which alone makes its individuality.
Thus the language of a people always has an influence upon
the manner in which new things, recently learned, are classified
in the mind and are subsequently thought of; these new things
are thus forced to adapt themselves to pre-existing forms. For
this reason the language which men spoke when they undertook
to construct an elaborate representation of the universe marked
the system of ideas which was then born with an indelible trace.
(Durkheim, 1957, pp. 75-76)
Sapir stated categorically "that the 'real world' is to a large extent
unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group ." (Sapir,
in Hoijer, 1955, p. 558) This statement represents the essential core
of thought around which has grown the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis; which in turn is the basis of the theoretical orientations various,.
ly labelled ethnolinguistics, m etalinguistics, psycholinguistics, or exolinguistics. This orientation is elaborated by Whorf in four essays:
"The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language"
( 1939), "Science and Linguistics" ( 1940), "Linguistics as an Exact
Science" ( 1940) , "Language and Logic" ( 1941) .
In "Science and Linguistics," Whorf extends Sapir's position:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The categories and types that we isolate from the world
of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every
observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a
kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by
our minds ... and this means largely by the linguistic systems
in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and
ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to
an agreement to organize it in this way-an agreement that
holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the
patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an
implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement decrees.
(Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)
The significance of this dissection of nature by linguistic systems
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is that each such discussion is valid only to the users of the particular
linguistic system. This is in effect another "principle of relativity."
It decrees that observers with different linguistic backgrounds will,
from the same physical evidence, develop different interpretations
of "reality." Though different, these various interpretations are equally logical. To a great extent, the same principle must apply to the
users of disciplinary jargon and the modern specialists (from ethnomusicologists to aeronautical anthropologists ) whose cant and rhetoric
distinguish them and their world view from the layman who also has
a universe of discourse all his own. The implica tion then is that
science, for example, is simply the interpretation of reality derived by
use of the language of science; and, as a result, has no prior claim
over other interpretations as an approximation of reality.
Language is thus a reifying agent. It is the medium of conceptualizing reality. In his attempt to delinea te a "sociology of knowledge," Karl Mannheim sought the social origins of men's thoughts.
And he wrote that though thought is manifested in the minds of individuals, an emphasis on the individual and his thought will not yield
the needed perspective.
Says M annheim, the individual "thinks in the manner in which his
group thinks. He finds a t his disposal only certain words and their
meanings. These not only determine to a large extent the avenues of
approach to the surrounding world, but they also show a t the same
time from which angle and in which context of activity objects have
hitherto been perceptible and accessible to the group or the indvidual."
(Mannheim, 1936, p. 3)
The relation of la nguage, thought, and reality was long the special
interest of Ernst Cassirer. Language is the realization of man's
propensity to symbolically conceptuali ze his thought and feeling.
Though a highly sophisticated form of symbolic expression, its reliance upon metaphor and analogy in the process of naming m akes
language facilitate non-rational as well as rational thought. It was
this mixture of the rational a nd non-rational in language that led
Cassirer to his consideration of the relation of language to "theories
of knowledge." (Cassirer, 1946 )
It was Cassirer's opinion tha t the "theories of knowledge" ( science
and other forms) overemphasized "facts" and the development of
orderly thought about "facts." This overemphasis of "facts" was accomplished a t the expense of any a ttention being given to the nonra tional or non-tactual aspects of mankind's thought. Non-rational
thought was dismissed, from the study of knowledge, as being either
mysticism or plain ignora nce. In either case, it was not considered
pertinent to the study of knowledge.
Cassirer, however, felt that a theory of "knowledge" should include
a search for the reason behind this sort of "ignorance." While sci39

entists and logicians bemoaned the misconceptions bred by this "ignorance" and by language itself, Cassirer posited a question: Why
should language, an instrument for conveying thought, deter and distort scientific thought?
If language distorts scientific thought, it must do so by giving
preference and support to another form of thought. And since all
thinking deals with phenomena as presented in immediate experience,
there cannot be a way of thinking that is not true to the reports of
the senses. And if language is incompatible with scientific reasoning,
then it must reflect a system of experience that is different from the
accepted mode of experiencing "scientific facts."
Language originated as a form of pre-scientific symbolism. As such,
it, like myth, was developed to give expression to "values," not to
"facts." Language, itself, developed from the process of naming and
making metaphorical allusions to phenomena and experience. Names
and metaphors are the essence of mystical symbols. To name an object
gives you power over it and understanding of it.
Thus language and myth are two modes of thought, born out of
the same evolutionary stage, which developed together as expression
and conception, respectively, of the primitive man's world.
But whereas language, like myth and religion, originated as emotional expression, due to its syntactic structure language avails itself
of reason as well as emotion. Because the units of emotional expression can be linked together to give further meaning, language
facilitates logical thinking, i.e., reason. By the syntax of language the
chasm between the symbolic expression of emotion and the discursive
level of rational thought is bridged. But by the same token, our
language, and ultimately our thought, no matter how disciplined, is
pervaded with non-rational symbolism.
Language utilizes rational and non-rational symbols in the expression of thought and feeling. Science, as an idea system, uses both
mathematical and grammatical language. To the extent that it avails
itself of grammatical language, science contains elements of the nonrational. Some of the distinctions ( and commonalities) between
rational and non-rational symbolization can be represented by the
following illustration.

I.

II.
III.

Scientific Symbolism
(concepts)
Discursive mastery, by
means of rules and procedures, of a world intuitively apprehended.
Expression of facts.
Science.

I.

II.
III.
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Non-Scientific
Symbolism
Intuitive elaboration of
expenences.

Expression of values.
Art, Myth, Religion.

IV.

IV.

True-false.

Sacred-Profane.
Life-Death.

Dorothy Lee has discussed the reification of symbols in general.
( Lee, 1954) She suggests that the symbol is only one part of a complex field which can be depicted as follows:

0
0

s

S =symbol

=individual

____,!

=thing

- - - - - - - . ) =process

For specific application to science, this is easily adapted to:

0
O

C

C

=individual

=thing

=concept

- - - - - - - - ) =process

The "concept" is then part of a whole or system which includes:
the individual or scientist, the thing ( object in reality), the concept,
and the conceptualizing process. Thus scientific concepts are part of a
process whereby the discursive world is created out of the "real"
world of undifferentiated physical phenomena.
The general system of conceptualization, by which the world of
reality is shaped, is inherent in the use of symbols to derive order and
meaning from experience. The conceptual process structures "things"
out of an infinitely faceted reality. Once conceptualized, the "thing"
and the word-symbol representing it are interdependent upon one another and the other components of the system.
This is evident in scientific, as well as literary and religious, tradi-
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tions. The processual nature of scientific conceptualization is manifested in experimentation and repetition of tests. Only when the
"concept" has been subjected to use or scrutiny in experienced situations does it acquire meaning. Scientific disciplines proceed on this
assumption and systematically increase the meaning ( or reliability) of
their concepts through repeated testing. In the same manner the
symbols of literature acquire specific meaning through repeated
usage within the body of the literary tradition. Likewise, religious
symbols (cross, crescent, Sta r of David, etc.) acquire meaning from
ritualized ceremonial usage within the religious tradition.
The significance of this orientation is that meaning (whether
literary, scientific, or philosophical ) is derived in the various disciplines
via substantively the same conceptual process. The concept gains or
loses meaning through use in concrete situations. Once the situation
is experience, by the scientist or artist or philosopher, through the
utilizing of a concept, then that concept becomes the avenue for
examination of this conceptualized situation. The concept is in process, containing and conveying the situational meaning. It acquires
meaning (becomes reified) by repetitive empirical use. Thus the
seemingly disparate views of reality offered by science and other disciplines are grounded within a common processual method of linguistic
symbolization, m eaning deriva tion, and object reification.
Such an interpretation is posed in the hope that from it, and / or
consequent considerations, a transdisciplinary framework for integrated
general studies might evolve.
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